The nature of political time changes in different political systems. Democratic states embed deliberation in largely predetermined term lengths, with a tendency towards crisis, overconfidence and a sometimes-neurotic concern with their own demise. [1]  While authoritarian states condense time through decisiveness and direction, looking further into the future, democracies struggle to act for the long-term but have shown remarkable resilience to shocks. Authoritarian states can think much further ahead but tend to collapse with startling speed (“Gradually, then suddenly” to borrow from Hemingway).

At least in democratic states, as different political time zones intersect, it is tempting to see the present (in general terms) and the present moment (in specific terms) as an inflection point, marking the start of something new. But applying the Copernican Principle, [2]  we’re much more likely to be in the middle of something, than at the beginning or end.

This rule of thumb might be an intuitive tool for predicting individual phenomena, from the popularity of musicals to the duration of the human species, but things don’t exist independently. Modern societies can be understood as the conjugation of demographic, economic, technological, political, environmental, … etc, arrangements, each operating on different timescales. The evolution of these can produce unique configurations and moments in which disjuncture outweighs continuity.

Three cyclical features of political time appear to be emerging and interacting simultaneously. Firstly, generational differences in values are driving changes in our political culture, or at least loom with the potential to do so. Secondly, the prevailing economic logic of the past 40 years is in decline, but the successor ideology remains unclear. Thirdly, we appear to be moving away from a system of U.S. hegemony to a polycentric and pluralistic international order. But there are also deeper, more irregular features of distorting contemporary political time, most notably COVID-19, climate change and digital information technology.

Though the immediate political crisis created by COVID-19 has subsided, it looks as if we are in ‘long political COVID’: [3]  A state, mirroring the virus, in which some of the symptoms persist, playing out for a long time after the infection has passed. In his long history of epidemics and pandemics, Brian Michael Jenkins suggests that societies, like individuals, suffer comorbidities and that a sharp loss of governability may accompany pandemics.[4] 

While climate change already ravages parts of the globe, its most potent impacts loom in our future. What could happen to our political culture if, having failed to decarbonise fast enough, inescapable images of suffering plaster our screens, the prospect of future catastrophes creep closer and we are incapable of action? What would happen to democratic politics if, because the climate seemed inhospitable to human life, hopelessness was endemic?

Digital information technology is, however, the greatest distortion of contemporary democratic political time. The process of democratic deliberation can be interpreted as a form of collective intelligence and a tool for overcoming individual cognitive biases. Democratic systems of governance slow politics down, in part by pooling views through party politics and public debate. However, digital information technology pressures us to think, form opinions and respond quickly, to parse information rapidly, to seek out views which confirm our own and to avoid contemplation. In short, it encourages cognitive bias and reduces the space for deliberative politics. [5] 

While big tech once offered a revolutionary and utopic vision (more connected, more democratic, more decentralised) which separated it from other forms of big business, its promise has crystalised in familiar concentrations of money, power and influence. To some political technologist, more technology is the solution: Political leaders could know the views of a populace instantaneously through app based surveys and referenda. However, this would accelerate political time. Deliberation (slow, discursive, nuanced) would become calculation (fast, constrained, binary).

While generational change, cycles of economic ideology, international power politics, COVID-19 or climate change have, or have the potential to, accelerate political time, they do so temporarily through moments of crisis and openness. Digital information technology may more fundamentally alter the pace of political time in way that appears to be incompatible with the deliberative process to core to the success of democratic states in the 20th century.

[1] David Runciman, The Confidence Trap.

[2] J. Richard Gott III, The Copernican Principle: How to Predict Everything.

[3] ‘Long political COVID’ credited to Mark Leonard.

[4] Brian Michael Jenkins, Plagues and Their Aftermath.

[5] Runciman, Democracy in the Age of Social Media.